Litigative Economics

RRC has extensive experience in assisting attorneys in relating complex legal matters to economic, financial, and statistical evidence. RRC has been successful in the analysis of issues such as contract violations, product liability and warranty, theft of trade secrets, discrimination, monopolization, price-fixing, monopsony purchasing, boycotts, licensing restrictions, and damage theories. Often economic evidence suggests a line of argument, supported by sound economic theory, which narrows
the scope of a case and offers an efficient, effective avenue for successful litigation. 

Price-fixing

Price-fixing in a market must not be confused with price leadership and the pricing practices of dominant firms. Competition implies a degree of price dispersion that can be statistically evaluated. An effective price conspiracy that alters prices in a market necessarily alters quantities in predictable directions. For plaintiffs, such pricing evidence must be inconsistent with reflections of a competitive market and must relate to other supporting evidence. An effective cartel must successfully allocate quantities and police member pricing and output decisions. Occasionally, channels of communication can be critical to the survival of an effective cartel, especially within an industry with several member firms. Reasonable doubt is often found in the ease of entry, taking into account financial risks associated with start-up investments, regulatory uncertainty, and other factors.